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INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme 
Court held that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriages 
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
U.S. Constitution.1  This ruling completed one of the swiftest 
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 1.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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and most dramatic sea changes in public opinion and legal 
status in recent history.  In 2005, ten years earlier, only 36% 
of adult Americans supported the institution of same-sex 
marriage,2 and only one state—Massachusetts—recognized its 
legality.3  By 2010, those numbers rose to 42%4 and six states,5 
respectively.  Following the Obergefell ruling, 57% of American 
adults supported same-sex marriage6 and its legality was 
established in all 50 states.7 
But these numbers mask another reality.  Opposition to 
same-sex marriage remains strong and fervent.  A Barna 
Group survey conducted shortly after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling found that 43% of American adults disagreed with the 
Court’s decision.8  That survey also indicated that 94% of 
theologically-defined evangelical Christians strongly oppose 
same-sex marriage.9  Conservative religious leaders10 and GOP 
presidential hopefuls11 have vowed to continue their opposition 
to same-sex marriage, despite the Obergefell ruling.  As Tony 
Perkins, President of the Christian Family Research Council 
summarized: “It is folly for the Court to think that it has 
resolved a controversial issue of public policy.  By 
 
 2.  Pew Research Center, Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, 
but Key Segments Remain Opposed, (June 8, 2015), available at 
http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08  (hereinafter “Support for Same-Sex 
Marriage”). 
 3.  Freedom to Marry, History and Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the 
United States, (last updated June 26, 2015), available at http://www.
freedomtomarry.org/pages/history-and-timeline-of-marriage.  See Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 4.  Pew Research Center, supra note 2. 
 5.  Marriage Equality USA, Facts at a Glance, (last updated July 8, 2015), 
available at http://www.marriageequality.org/facts_at_a_glance. 
 6.  Pew Research Center, supra note 2. 
 7.  Marriage Equality USA, supra note 5. 
 8.  Barna Group, Christians React to the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 
(July 1, 2015), available at https://www.barna.org/barna-update/culture/723-
christians-react-to-the-legalization-of-same-sex-marriage-9-key-
findings#.Vp2r4HhD2FJ. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Tamara Audi & Jacob Gershman, Religious Groups Vow to Fight Gay 
Marriage Despite Supreme Court, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (last updated June 
26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/religious-groups-vow-tofight-same-sex-
marriage-despite-supreme-court-1435329751. 
 11.  Fredreka Schouten & Paul Singer, GOP Presidential Candidates 
Denounce Gay-Marriage Ruling, USA TODAY (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2015/06/26/supreme
-court-gay-marriage-presidential-candidates/29337835/. 
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disenfranchising 50 million Americans, the Court has instead 
supercharged the issue.”12 
One of the likely battlefields for this opposition is the 
American workplace.  As exemplified by the facts in Koren v. 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co., supervisors who oppose same-sex marriage 
may act on that belief by harassing or terminating an employee 
who has entered into such a union.13  In that case, the plaintiff, 
Jason Koren, married in a state that recognized lawful same-
sex marriage and adopted his spouse’s last name.14  Upon 
returning to work, his supervisor began to harass him because 
the supervisor could not accept that a man would marry 
another man, and the employer eventually terminated Koren’s 
employment.15  Because federal anti-discrimination law, as 
embodied in Title VII, does not include “sexual orientation” 
among its list of protected classes,16 it is not clear that most 
federal courts would find such conduct to be unlawful 
This Article contends that such conduct properly should be 
treated as unlawful “sex” discrimination based on two 
different, but complementary, theories.  First, discrimination 
in response to same-sex marriage involves sex-based 
stereotyping grounded in the belief that marrying someone of 
the same sex constitutes gender-nonconforming behavior.  
Second, such conduct involves actionable relational or 
associational discrimination akin to a situation in which an 
employer takes adverse action against a white employee 
because of the fact that the employee has an African-American 
spouse. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the 
accepted meaning of the terms “sex,” “gender,” and “sexual 
orientation,” pointing out their relationships and differences in 
order to create a common language for understanding the 
analysis throughout the remainder of the Article.  Part II 
explores the development of Title VII’s sex discrimination 
jurisprudence first as a general matter and then as it relates 
 
 12.  Carol Hopkins, Religious, Conservative Groups Opposed to Gay Marriage 
Vow to Fight Supreme Court Ruling, THE OAKLAND PRESS (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.theoaklandpress.com/article/OP/20150626/NEWS/150629646. 
 13.  Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034–35 (N.D. Ohio 
2012). 
 14.  Id. at 1034. 
 15.  Id. at 1034–35. 
 16.  Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2015). 
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specifically to cases that the courts have defined as “sexual 
orientation” cases.  Part III chronicles the development of the 
sex-stereotyping theory as a basis for Title VII liability.  Part 
IV introduces the concept of relational discrimination under 
Title VII and follows its development in both the race and sex 
contexts.  Finally, Part V argues that employees treated 
adversely due to being in a same-sex marriage should fall 
within Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination both by virtue of 
engaging in gender non-conforming behavior and, more 
directly, as relational discrimination. 
I. SEX, GENDER, & SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
America is a “sex”-based culture, in that most of our 
cultural expectations, presumptions, and prohibitions are tied 
to the accident of birth that leaves some with penises and 
others with vaginas.17  Once “sex” has been established, 
“gender” is then built up around it, creating a gloss of cultural 
meaning and expectations regarding attire, behavior, 
mannerisms, career tracks, and life goals.18  As the feminist 
existentialist Simone de Beauvoir observed, “one is not born a 
women, but rather becomes one.”19  Like “gender,” “sexual 
orientation” is another extension of and gloss on a person’s 
“sex” and generally understood to mean the emotional or 
physical attraction by a person of one sex to members of the 
same sex, opposite sex, or both.20 
For the average American, these concepts are aggregated 
into an expectation that males are masculine and attracted to 
 
 17.  Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation 
of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 
166, 175 (1996) (comparing America’s sex-based culture to the gender-based 
culture of ancient Greece as a means of illustrating the differences between the 
two concepts).  The term “sex” is generally understood to mean biological or 
physical differences, most notably external genital anatomy, though the term can 
also be used to denote chromosomal differences.  There is some discussion in the 
feminist literature, however, suggesting that “sex” can be understood as social 
constructed as well.  See Judith Butler, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990).  While there is some merit to this view, adopting 
that view would needlessly complicate the matters discussed herein. 
 18.  Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing 
the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American 
Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 n.6 (1995). 
 19.  Butler, supra note 17, at 1. 
 20.  Valdes, supra note 18, at 6 n.7. 
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females, while females are feminine and attracted to males.21  
Until only recently, judges reaffirmed and institutionalized 
these expectations, which led to a legally enforced system of 
gender roles.22  In response, feminist legal scholars proposed 
the disaggregation of sex and gender in the law.23  They pointed 
out that femininity was not an essential trait of womanhood, 
but rather a socially constructed one.24  Yet, because society 
conflates the two, judgments regarding a person’s gender 
necessarily implicate his or her sex as well.25  For example, an 
employer who terminates a male employee for being too 
effeminate has made a judgment that his gender expression 
(femininity) is inappropriate in relation to his biological sex 
(male).  The termination would, therefore, stem from an 
expectation that gender and sex ought to be aligned, and 
therefore implicates both sex and gender. 
The relationship between “sex” and “sexual orientation” is 
somewhat more complicated, but no less essential.  Sexual 
orientation is the relationship between an individual’s sex and 
 
 21.  Valdes, supra note 18, at 12. 
 22.  The most famous example of this is Justice Bradley’s concurrence in 
Bradwell v. Illinois, where he states: 
The civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.  
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.  The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.  The constitution of the 
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as 
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which 
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.  The 
harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or 
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a 
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill 
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.  This is the law of the 
Creator.  And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general 
constitution of things . . . . 
83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 23.  See Butler, supra note 17, at 8. 
 24.  See Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963) (chronicling the 
frustration of women forced into the role of homemaker and mother, and 
challenging the stereotype that men alone should be the “breadwinners” of the 
family); see also Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex 
Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 247 (1965) (criticizing 
newspaper advertisements and state protective laws as based on gender 
stereotyping women into certain roles). 
 25.  Valdes, supra note 18, at 12. 
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the sex of their romantic or sexual partner.26  Sexual 
orientation, therefore, derives its meaning entirely from the 
existence of sex.  Without knowing the sex of both partners, a 
judgment regarding sexual orientation could not be made.27  
Sex and sexual orientation are also often conflated by the social 
phenomenon of heterosexism, i.e., the preference for and 
expectation that males will partner exclusively with females 
and vice versa.  In a way, this too is a cultural gloss on the 
notion of sex, suggesting that sexual orientation must also be 
related to gender.28 
This section is intended to highlight the interrelatedness 
of these three terms.  Professor Valdes illustrates this 
interconnectedness as the three corners of a triangle, each 
distinct but still necessarily connected by the “legs” of the 
triangle.29  Particularly in the employment discrimination 
arena, courts have taken an overly narrow view of these 
concepts.30  The next section will explore the judicial 
understanding of “sex” and “sexual orientation” under the 
rubric of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
II. SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful 
employment practice . . . to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of his race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin . . . .”31  The “sex” provision was added in an 
amendment, and though it may have been proposed for 
nefarious purposes, it found sufficient support from both 
 
 26.  Valdes, supra note 18, at 15. 
 27.  Valdes, supra note 18, at 18 (“if the sex and gender components of sexual 
orientation discrimination are disaggregated from sexual orientation, virtually 
noting remains to classify as discrimination ‘ “ based’ ”  on sexual orientation.”). 
 28.  See Zachary A. Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing 
Gender-Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 490 (2004) (“employers and coworkers often harass gay 
and lesbians in gender based terms because the act of homosexuality . . . is not 
the behavior that they commonly associate with how a ‘real man’ or a ‘real woman’ 
is supposed to behave.”). 
 29.  See Valdes, supra note 18, at 13. 
 30.  See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual 
Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 715, 
739–40 (2010). 
 31.  Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000(e), supra note 16). 
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conservative and progressive lawmakers to make its way into 
the final bill.32  Unfortunately, the scant legislative history and 
the general lack of knowledge regarding “sex” and “gender” 
during this time period combined to create no shortage of 
confusion, debate, and disagreement regarding the scope of the 
new “sex” provision.  This section will explore the evolution of 
sex discrimination law under Title VII beginning with the 
decade following its passage and continuing through the recent 
developments in the treatment of gays and lesbians. 
A. The Complicated History of Title VII’s “Sex” Provision 
In the early interpretations of the sex provision, courts 
tended to limit the ban on sex discrimination to biologically-
related distinctions.  In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., for 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that the 
“manifest purpose” of Title VII was “to ensure that men and 
women are treated equally.”33  The Holloway court went on to 
state that the meaning of the term “sex” in Title VII 
encompassed only “the traditional definition based on 
anatomical differences.”34  By focusing on the binary 
distinction between biological males and females, these courts 
ignored the broader implications of gender-related nuances 
with respect to identity and behavior.35 
In 1976, the Supreme Court adopted and compounded this 
narrow analysis.  In General Electric Company v. Gilbert, the 
Court considered a disability plan that excluded coverage for 
 
 32.  The addition of “sex” to the list of protected categories was proposed by 
Virginia Rep. Howard Smith.  The “Smith Amendment” surprised many in the 
House, as Smith was known as an ardent opponent of women’s rights, which lead 
to the assumption that it was designed as a “poison pill” that would kill the Act.  
See 110 Cong. Rec. 2581 (statement of Rep. Green).  Still, there is evidence that 
the true motive may have been to protect white women being discriminated 
against in favor of black women.  See id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Andrews).  
The Amendment also received the strong support of pro-women’s rights 
lawmakers, who believed the amendment would help free women from legally 
enforced gender roles and “protective legislation” that kept women in low paying 
jobs.  See id. at 2578 (statement of Rep. Griffiths); id. at 2580 (statement of Rep. 
St. George). 
 33.  Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 34.  Id. at 662; see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (stating that Title VII only prohibits discrimination against “biological 
male(s) or biological female(s) . . . .”). 
 35.  See Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-
Gender Behavior, 40 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 277, 280 (2005); McGinley, supra 
note 30. 
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pregnancy.36  Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist adopted 
a narrow anti-classification approach, holding that Title VII is 
violated only when the effect of a classification is to 
“discriminate against members of one class or another.”37  
Because the benefits of the disability plan accrued to both 
sexes, Justice Rehnquist concluded, “as there is no proof that 
the package is in fact worth more to men than women, it is 
impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect.”38  
Although Congress quickly overturned the decision,39 the 
narrow anti-classification approach continues to influence the 
law through the widespread use of comparators: employees 
“who are similar to the complainant in all respects but for the 
protected characteristic . . . .”40  As a heuristic, the use of 
comparators is popular because it allows the court to draw the 
inference that the protected characteristic, being the only 
difference, must have been the cause of the disparate 
treatment.41  Over time, the comparators heuristic morphed 
into a required element of proving sex discrimination for many 
 
 36.  General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976). 
 37.  Id. at 408 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976)). 
 38.  Id. at 409. 
 39.  Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), supra note 16) (“The [term] ‘because of 
sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions . . . ”); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 
U.S. 669, 678 (1983)  (“When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it 
unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning 
of the Court in the Gilbert decision.”).  Despite the seemingly unambiguous 
language of Congress and the Supreme Court, some lower courts have continued 
to hold that conditions related to pregnancy are not covered.  See, e.g., Derungs 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 893 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that 
a ban on breast-feeding was not discrimination “because of sex . . . ”). 
 40.  Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 
731 (2011); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“In the run of the mill discrimination cases . . . a plaintiff can make a 
showing of disparate treatment simply by pointing to the adverse employment 
action and the many employees who suffered no such fate.”). 
 41.  Goldberg, supra note 40, at 744–45 (“because of their utility in producing 
inferences of discrimination, comparators have emerged as the predominant 
methodological device for evaluating discrimination claims”).  Professor Goldberg 
also argues that the comparators heuristic fits with traditional “judicial-
legitimacy preferences that favor clearly defined and identifiable categories . . .” 
as well as for analysis that appears to “turn on ‘facts’ rather than normative 
judgments.”  Id. at 740; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping 
Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1955 (2006); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social 
Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002). 
1_BEFORT FINAL 3/25/2016  2:33 AM 
2016] SAME SEX MARRIAGE & TITLE VII 215 
judges.42  Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
endorsed such a requirement, some members of the Court have 
signaled their support for such an approach.43  This has led to 
no small amount of scholarly criticism, as the comparators 
heuristic, though useful, is woefully under-inclusive in light of 
contemporary understandings of sex and gender.44 
In 1986, the Court recognized “sexual harassment” as a 
second form of prohibited discrimination under Title VII,45 a 
form of discrimination recognized more than a decade earlier 
with respect to race discrimination.46  In Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson, the Court considered the claim of a bank teller, who 
was sexually harassed by her supervisor and eventually agreed 
to engage in sexual relations with him.47  Drawing on a race-
gender analogy, the Court concluded: “Sexual harassment 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’r, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995)  
(“plaintiff must show that this employer treated similarly situated employees 
outside his classification more favorably than herself.”); see also Paluck v. 
Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000); Norville v. Staten 
Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999); but see Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l. 
Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[plaintiff] is not required as a 
matter of law to point to a similarly situated white comparators in order to 
succeed on a race discrimination claim.”). 
 43.  See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 611 (1999) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“one who alleges discrimination must show that she ‘received 
differential treatment vis-à-vis members of a different group on the basis of a 
statutorily described characteristic.’ ” ); see also id. at 617 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 44.  Goldberg, supra note 40, at 742 (“The judicial default to comparators 
crowds out not only other heuristics, but also other more textured conceptions of 
discrimination, all of which is to the detriment of discrimination jurisprudence 
and theory.”). 
 45.  The court recognizes two forms of sexual harassment: “quid pro quo” 
harassment and “hostile work environment” harassment.  “Quid pro quo” 
harassment is found where some job-related status is conditioned on acceptance 
of a sexual advance.  See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
“Hostile work environment” harassment is found where an employer creates a 
work environment so “heavily charged” with sex discrimination “as to destroy 
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers.”  
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
22 (1993); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998); Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998); see also Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 46.  See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 242 (holding “hostile work environment” claims 
actionable as race discrimination); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City 
of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514–15 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 47.  Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60. 
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which creates a hostile or offensive work environment is every 
bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace 
that racial harassment is to racial equality.”48  Though the 
Court has continued to recognize “sexual harassment” claims, 
this cause of action has been considerably narrowed over the 
past twenty years.49 
In 1989, the Supreme Court recognized a third cause of 
action in the form of the “sex stereotyping” theory of sex 
discrimination.50  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a female 
associate at a large accounting firm was denied a partnership 
 
 48.  Id. at 66–67 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.)  Race-gender analogies 
were not uncommon at this time.  Professor Murray first used these analogies in 
her path-breaking law review article challenging the widely held belief that sex 
discrimination was a less severe problem than race discrimination.  See Pauli 
Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, supra note 24.  For a more thorough discussion of 
race-gender analogies in the women’s rights movement see Serena Mayeri, “A 
Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical 
Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001). 
 49.  The courts have limited the “sexual harassment” line in many ways.  
First, the Supreme Court created an affirmative defense to liability and damages 
where the employer took reasonable steps to prevent or promptly correct the 
sexual harassment and the employee failed to take advantage of the preventative 
or corrective opportunities.  See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
771.  Second, the lower courts have rigorously construed the requirement that 
sexual harassment must be “severe and pervasive” in nature.  See, e.g., Duncan 
v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting as 
insufficiently severe the claims of a female employee whose supervisors maligned 
her as the president of the “man haters club,” arranged to have her arrested, then 
took her to a bar and tried to force her to write a list of misogynist statements).  
Third, a circuit split has also grown around the question of whether to apply the 
standard to the individual events or the entire situation in the aggregate.  
Compare Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir. 1995)  
(analyzing each instance of alleged discrimination individually to determine if 
the instance was “severe”) with Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 
562 (6th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the “totality of the circumstances” to determine of, 
in the aggregate, the discrimination was “severe and pervasive”).  Fourth, in a 
particularly troubling development, the courts have also taken it upon 
themselves to determine whether the sexual harassment was objectively 
“unwelcome,” a highly dubious requirement that has led to at least one infamous 
and hugely embarrassing judicial pronouncement.  See Burns v. McGregor 
Electronic Industries, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 506, 508–09 (N.D. Iowa 1992) 
(concluding that a female employee could not have been objectively offended by 
her employer’s sexual harassment because she has previously posed naked for a 
magazine), rev’d, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 50.  Judge Posner questions whether Price Waterhouse actually created a 
separate cause of action or whether the court intended for sex-stereotypes to serve 
merely as evidence of sex discrimination.  Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc., 
332 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring).  Most of the courts 
reviewing sex discrimination, however, have treated sex stereotyping as a 
separate cause of action. 
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because she failed to conform to the feminine image and 
demeanor expected by her superiors.51  She was told she should 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry.”52  Painting with broad strokes, the Court interpreted 
Title VII “to mean that gender must be irrelevant to 
employment decisions.”53  In so doing, the court set aside anti-
classification heuristics and adopted a broad view that focused 
more on the intent of the perpetrator, even when the result 
does not categorize people into easily distinguishable 
comparators.  Relying on this new understanding, the Court 
found: “In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer 
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”54  The Court concluded, “we are beyond the day when 
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group . . . .”55 
In 1998, the Court took a step forward and a step back in 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.56  In that case, a male 
employee was brutally harassed and physically assaulted by 
his co-workers.57  The Court held that same-sex sexual 
 
 51.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234–35 (1989). 
 52.  Id. at 235. 
 53.  Id. at 240. 
 54.  Id. at 250.  The lower courts have applied logic similar to this passage 
from Price Waterhouse in a number of recent decisions targeting policies that 
unfairly prohibit mothers from finding work.  See Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 
561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that a woman who was denied a 
promotion because she had three children could make a sex-stereotyping claim 
under Title VII); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 
107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004)  (concluding that stereotyping women as “caregivers” can 
by itself be an impermissible, sex-based motive). 
 55.  Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1791.  The Court’s use of “gender” and 
stereotyping, which implicates socially constructed gender, has led to the 
conclusion by many judges and scholars that “sex” and “gender” are both 
protected under Title VII.  However, the Supreme Court has not definitively 
adopted this position. 
 56.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001–03 
(1998). 
 57.  Id. at 1001.  “Oncale alleges that the harassment included Pippen and 
Johnson restraining him while Lyons placed his penis on Oncale’s neck, on one 
occasion, and on Oncale’s arm, on another occasion; threats of homosexual rape 
by Lyons and Pippen; and the use of force by Lyons to push a bar of soap into 
Oncale’s anus while Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on 
Sundowner premises.”  Oncale v. Sundownder Offshore Srvs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 
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harassment could rise to the level of actionable sex 
discrimination, resolving a split among the circuit courts.58  
Responding to strict textualist criticisms, the Court stated, 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the 
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.”59  This surprising step 
to expand the coverage of Title VII gave many commentators 
hope that the Court was opening the door to an even broader 
interpretation of sex discrimination.60  Those hopes may have 
been premature, as the Court also included narrowing 
language.  Oncale listed only three ways in which a plaintiff 
could prove actionable same-sex harassment, leading a few 
lower courts to conclude that those paths are exclusive.61 
This brief history offers three insights relevant to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and same-sex 
relationships.  First, the use of comparators provides a useful, 
though imperfect, methodology for determining whether sex 
discrimination has occurred, and the courts rely heavily, in 
some cases even exclusively, on this method.  Second, another 
useful heuristic is the use of race-gender analogies, which may 
reveal discrimination that would normally be veiled by our 
 
118–19 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 58.  Compare Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (holding same-sex sexual harassment unprotected under Title VII); 
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); with McWilliams v. 
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding same-
sex sexual harassment actionable only where the harasser is homosexual); Doe v. 
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding same-sex sexual harassment 
actionable, and applying the same standard as opposite-sex sexual harassment). 
 59.  Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002. 
 60.  See generally Matthew Fedor, Can Price Waterhouse and Gender 
Stereotyping Save the Day for Same-Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Under Title 
VII? A Careful Reading of Oncale Compels an Affirmative Answer, 32 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 455 (2002). 
 61.  Justice Scalia held that sex discrimination could be shown by (1) 
“credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual,” (2) “general hostility to the 
presence of women in the workplace,” or (3) “comparative evidence about how the 
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace” (i.e. 
comparators).  Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1002.  This led the Fifth Circuit to conclude 
that these categories were exclusive.  E.E.O.C. v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., 
689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012).  There is also a split within the Sixth Circuit on the 
question of exclusivity.  Compare Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, Inc., 682 F.3d 
463 (6th Cir. 2012) (assuming that the Oncale categories were exclusive); with 
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir 2004) (applying sex stereotyping 
theory to find transsexuals protected under Title VII). 
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preconceived notions and prejudices regarding socially 
constructed gender roles.  Third, though the courts have 
struggled in determining the reach of this cause of action, it is 
clear that Title VII prohibits the use of sex stereotypes in 
employment decisions.  As discussed below, these three 
insights are crucial to understanding how and why Title VII 
should apply to same-sex relationships, but first some 
discussion is necessary as to how courts have treated sexual 
orientation under Title VII. 
B. Sexual Orientation 
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit heard the case of Kenneth 
Ulane, a decorated veteran who was terminated after having 
surgery to become female.62  Illinois District Court Judge 
Grady’s opinion in the case was an early attempt to 
disaggregate sex and gender, holding, “sex is not a cut-and-
dried matter of chromosomes,” but involves society’s 
perception of the individual.63  Unfortunately, the Seventh 
Circuit was not as progressive, and summarily reversed, 
holding that “sex” should be given its “ordinary, common 
meaning.”64  The Court found support for this conclusion in the 
“dearth of legislative history” and the fact that Congress had 
attempted and failed to amend Title VII to include 
“affectational or sexual orientation.”65  Although the case did 
not involve a homosexual plaintiff, the Ulane court’s’ logic has 
become the foundation for limitations in sex discrimination law 
relating to sexual orientation and non-conforming gender 
 
 62.  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983).  Although 
this case was not about sexual orientation, it is important to remember that 
during this time there was still substantial bias against all forms of gender non-
conforming behavior whether it was homosexuality or “transexualism,” and the 
courts tended to treat the two as one and the same.  See also Holloway v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 63.  See Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825.  Judge Grady’s prophetic decision has 
enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years.  Both commentators and 
judges have looked to that decision, rather than the majority decisions in this and 
other early transgender cases, as instructive on the proper interpretation of sex 
discrimination.  See generally Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 
(D.D.C. 2006) (“it may be time to revisit Judge Grady’s conclusion in Ulane I that 
discrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is ‘literally’ 
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’ ” ). 
 64.  Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 65.  Id. 
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identities.66 
The courts have universally held that sexual orientation is 
not a protected class under Title VII.67  For example, in 1979 
the Ninth Circuit held in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. that: “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ 
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of 
gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual 
preference such as homosexuality.”68  Although the courts do 
occasionally decry discrimination against gays and lesbians, in 
the absence of any evidence of discrimination based on some 
other protected status such as race or sex, they will not hold an 
employer liable for discrimination under Title VII.69 
To a certain extent, however, it is perhaps more accurate 
to say that “homosexuality” is not a protected class.  In contrast 
to the clearly unprotected status of homosexual employees, the 
courts have utilized Title VII to protect heterosexual 
employees in two notable instances. 
First, heterosexual employees are protected from 
homosexual supervisors, even when the harassment is 
triggered not by attraction or sex, but by the heterosexual 
status of the employee.70  In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 
 
 66.  See Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081; see also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 
1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000)  (“Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological 
male or biological female,’ and not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.”; 
Siminton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“we are informed by Congress’ 
rejection, on numerous occasions, of bills that would have extended Title VII’s 
protection to people based on their sexual preferences.”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Authority, No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah 2005) (“Title VII does 
not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s transsexualism” ), aff’d on 
other grounds, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 67.  See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 
(1st Cir. 1999) (“[it is] settled law that, as drafted and authoritatively construed, 
Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation.”). 
 68.  DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 
(9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). 
 69.  See e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Center, 224 F.3d 
701 (7th Cir. 2000); Siminton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins 
v.  New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“We hold 
no brief for harassment because of sexual orientation; it is a noxious practice, 
deserving of censure and opprobrium . . . [but] Title VII does not proscribe 
harassment simply because of sexual orientation.”); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards 
& Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 70.  See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Johnson v. Community Nursing Services, 985 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Utah 1997); 
Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., Civ. A. No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 
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a young heterosexual male was sexually harassed when his 
homosexual co-workers discovered his sexual orientation.71  
The court found that his sex was the “but for” cause of the 
harassment because no women were subjected to the same 
harassment.72  The court, however, overlooked the fact that no 
homosexual men were similarly harassed, and the harassment 
was triggered, not by sex, but by the discovery that the 
employee was heterosexual.73  Thus, sexual orientation, rather 
than sex, was clearly the motivating factor for the harassing 
conduct.  Conversely, when the harassment is perpetrated by 
a bisexual or heterosexual supervisor, the courts are rarely so 
protective of the employee victim.74  The Supreme Court has 
 
241855 (E.D. La. 1995).  The Supreme Court approved of this “homosexual 
supervisor” avenue in Oncale.  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Srvs., 118 S.Ct. 
998, 1002 (1998).  Unfortunately, the decision also forced judges into the 
uncomfortable position of having to pass judgment on the sexual orientation of 
defendants.  See Shephard v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing at length whether evidence of mock flirtations and defendant 
“rubbing himself into an erection” could constitute “credible evidence” of 
homosexuality).  As a result there arose a circuit split on the question of what 
constitutes “credible evidence” of homosexuality.  Compare La Day v. Catalyst 
Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that “credible evidence” 
includes either evidence of desire toward the plaintiff or evidence of propositions 
made to other employees of the same sex); Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 
182 (5th Cir. 2012) (same) with Dick v. Phone Directories Co., Inc., 397 F.3d 1256 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that only evidence of sexual attraction toward plaintiff 
could suffice as “credible evidence”). 
 71.  Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138, 139–40 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 72.  See id. at 143. 
 73.  When the Pizza Hut hired a new male employee the homosexual 
employees would “attempt to learn” the sexual orientation of the new employee.  
Id. at 139.  Only after the homosexual employees discovered that Wrightson and 
other new employees were heterosexual did the harassment begin, and this 
harassment was perpetrated by the homosexual employees against the 
heterosexual employees.  Id. 
 74.  The “bisexual” or “equal opportunity” harasser has become a classic 
defense to a sex discrimination charge.  The defense is based on the assumption 
that even if the supervisor engages in severe, pervasive, and unwelcome sexual 
harassment, no liability will attach so long as he or she treats all employees in 
the same manner.  See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).  
This is a classic, and heavily criticized, hole in the anti-classification approach to 
discrimination law.  See, e.g., Mark McCullough, One is a Claim, Two is a Defense: 
Bringing an End to the Equal Opportunity Harasser Defense, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 
469 (2005); Kyle Mothershead, How the “Equal Opportunity” Sexual Harasser 
Discriminates on the Basis of Gender Under Title VII, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1205 
(2002); David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem 
in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002); Shylah Miles, 
Comment, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminating the Equal-
Opportunity-Harasser Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603 (2001). 
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since approved this double standard in Oncale.75 
Second, heterosexuality as a sexual orientation is often 
presumed and automatically subsumed into traditional sex 
discrimination analysis.76  On the other hand, same-sex 
harassment triggers a variety of defensive analytical 
mechanisms designed to prevent gays and lesbians from 
raising “sexual orientation” claims.77  In Meritor, for example, 
which involved opposite sex harassment, the court discerned 
impermissible sexual harassment without once mentioning the 
sexual orientation of the employee, even though it could easily 
have been argued that the harassment resulted not from the 
female employee’s sex, but from her supervisor’s perception as 
to her sexual orientation, i.e., her potential willingness to 
engage in sexual activity with someone of the supervisor’s 
gender.78  On the other hand, courts often fixate on a plaintiff’s 
homosexual orientation to assume the absence of gender-based 
discrimination.79 
Thus, heterosexuality enjoys a privileged status under 
Title VII.  Heterosexuality is often treated as part and parcel 
with “sex,” while homosexual plaintiffs are denied the same 
assumption and must prove both that they were discriminated 
because of their sex and not because of their sexual 
orientation.80  This double standard creates an artificially high 
barrier for LGBT plaintiffs in Title VII cases, a barrier which 
we must address in arguing that discrimination against legal 
same-sex marriages, although arguably a subset of sexual 
orientation related cases, should nonetheless be covered within 
 
 75.  See Oncale v. Sundownder Offshore Srvs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002 
(1998).  
 76.  Kramer, supra note 28. 
 77.  See Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the 
Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE L. J. & FEMINISM 375, 393 (1995) (“the 
courts’ explicit and consistent refusal to apply Title VII to cases of harassment or 
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, while the rhetoric of sexual 
harassment law suggests that employees are protected from harassment which 
targets their sexuality, they are in reality protected only from harassment which 
targets their heterosexuality”) (emphasis omitted). 
 78.  See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66. 
 79.  See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
205, 229-32 (2009). 
 80.  See Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1158, 1159 (1991); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto 
(An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1992); see also Grose, supra 
note 77, at 393. 
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the current Title VII paradigm.  However, the more 
conventional avenue of “sex-stereotyping” is also available to 
protect LGBT Americans who enter into legal same-sex 
marriages, and it is to this principle that we now turn. 
III. SEX-STEREOTYPING DISCRIMINATION 
Despite this rejection of “sexual orientation” as a protected 
class, most courts still allow gay and lesbian plaintiffs to 
maintain claims based on sex or race without having their 
sexual orientation automatically defeat those claims.81  
However, this has created some difficulty for the courts as 
society’s evolving understanding of sex and sexual orientation 
can make it hard to distinguish between gender claims and 
sexual orientation claims.82  Many gay men find themselves 
subjected to anti-gay barbs not because they are gay, but 
because they fail to conform to the strictures of masculinity.83  
At the same time, many heterosexual men are subjected to 
anti-gay epithets, not because they fail to conform, but as a 
means of emasculation.84  These behaviors illustrate the 
 
 81.  See Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We 
have never made the viability of sexual harassment claims dependent upon the 
sexual orientation of the harasser, and we are convinced that it would be both 
unwise and improper to begin doing so.”); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country 
Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222–23 (D. Or. 2002) (“Nothing in Title VII suggests 
that Congress intended to confine the benefits of that statute to heterosexual 
employees alone. . . .If an employer subjected a heterosexual employee to the sort 
of abuse allegedly endured by Heller . . . the evidence would be sufficient to state 
a claim for violation of Title VII.  The result should not differ simply because the 
victim of the harassment is homosexual.”). 
 82.  See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In 
all likelihood, any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable 
under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all 
homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their 
sexual practices.”); see also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (“it is often difficult to discern when Dawson is alleging that the various 
adverse employment actions allegedly visited upon her by Bumble & Bumble 
were motivated by animus toward her gender, her appearance, her sexual 
orientation, or some combination of these”). 
 83.  See McGinley, supra note 30, at 716 (“Masculinities research 
demonstrates that much harassing behavior directed at gays and transsexuals 
occurs because of sex or gender . . .  [t]he victim is harassed because he or she . . . 
is perceived to be insufficiently masculine to continue in the job.”). 
 84.  See Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other 
Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay:” Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace 
Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After 
Oncale, 11 YALE, J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 196–97 (1999) (“the derision directed at 
these males who project an insufficiently masculine sexuality frequently includes 
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interrelated nature of gender and sexual orientation.  This 
interrelatedness defies the rigid distinctions demanded by 
courts’ current sex discrimination jurisprudence that 
distinguishes between actionable gender discrimination and 
permissible sexual orientation discrimination.  Sex-
stereotyping theory offers an alternative avenue for plaintiffs 
that is not quite as black and white. 
Following Price Waterhouse, Title VII plaintiffs began to 
allege sex-stereotyping claims to challenge adverse actions 
taken in response to gender non-conforming behavior.  In 
general, these claims invoked Title VII’s sex provision citing a 
discrepancy between an employee’s expressed gender behavior 
as compared to the employee’s biological or anchor gender.85 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nichols v. Azteca 
Restaurant86  exemplifies this trend.  That case involved the 
claim of a male restaurant employee who was referred to as a 
“female whore” and told that he carried his tray “like a 
woman.”87  The Ninth Circuit reviewed its earlier DeSantis 
decision and concluded that it was no longer good law in light 
of Price Waterhouse.88  The court then applied the sex 
stereotyping theory and found that the harassment was 
“closely linked to gender” and actionable under Title VII.89  
Price Waterhouse, Nichols, and a few other cases90 gave 
advocates hope that the sex-stereotyping route might offer gay 
and lesbian employees some protection from anti-gay 
harassment in the workplace.91 
 
epithets or comments insinuating that the target is homosexual.”).  One need not 
be a feminist scholar or queer theorist to recognize that sexual orientation is often 
used as a stand in for sex-based oppression, particularly in all-male 
environments.  The use of anti-gay slurs such as “fag,” “faggot,” or “queer,” serve 
to emasculate the target, implicitly suggesting that they are feminine or 
insufficiently masculine.  See, e.g., Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 183 F. Supp. 
2d 726, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2002); E.E.O.C. v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Civ. A. No. 
1:06-CV-2560-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 85.  See Kramer, supra note 28, at 485–86. 
 86.  Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 87.  Id. at 870. 
 88.  Id. at 875. 
 89.  See id. at 874. 
 90.  See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Pregerson, J., concurring); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. 
Supp. 2d 1212 (D.Or. 2002); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 
2002). 
 91.  See Olivia Szwalbnest, Discriminating Because of “Pizzazz”: Why 
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In spite of decisions like Nichols, courts for many years 
had a difficult time ascertaining the appropriate dividing line 
between protected gender non-conforming behavior and the 
unprotected status of sexual orientation, even in cases of sex-
stereotyping.92  As a result, courts, in practice, were more apt 
to reject stereotyping claims when asserted by gay, lesbian, or 
transgender plaintiffs than when asserted by straight 
plaintiffs or plaintiffs whose sexual orientation was 
unknown.93  In essence, some courts treated the former group 
of plaintiffs as if their status automatically trumped their 
gender non-conforming behavior.94 
The most common analytical method for rejecting sex-
stereotyping claims asserted by homosexual and transsexual 
employees has been for courts to resort to the “anti-
bootstrapping” principle.95  In Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 
 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation Evidences Sexual Discrimination 
Under the Sex-Stereotyping Doctrine of Title VII, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 90–
91 (2011) (arguing that sexual orientation is a trait that should itself be treated 
as protected gender non-conforming behavior); but see Ryan M. Martin, 
Comment, Return to Gender: Finding a Middle Ground in Sex Stereotyping 
Claims Involving Homosexual Plaintiffs Under Title VII, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 371, 
392–94 (2007) (arguing that the fact that an employee is dating someone of the 
same gender should not be protected as gender non-conforming behavior). 
 92.  See McGinley, supra note 30, at 738–39 (stating that “the cases 
demonstrate that drawing this line is virtually impossible.”). 
 93.  See Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287, 
304 (2011) (“if a claim makes any mention of homosexuality, then it is a sexual 
orientation claim and must fail.  And because the cultural stigma attached to 
homosexuality is so overwhelming, the deck is stacked against lesbian and gay 
employees who seek to raise gender-stereotyping claims, as courts tend to view 
their sex discrimination claims through the lens of homosexuality.”); see, e.g., Kay 
v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 Fed. Appx. 48, 2005 WL 1678816 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that attacks on his gender non-conformity, such as taunts about not 
being a “real man” because he wore an earring, were really discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and not sex.). 
 94.  See Kramer, supra note 28, at 304 (stating that “[o]nce a court identifies 
an employee as gay or lesbian, the court makes itself hyperaware of the 
employee’s homosexuality, thereby enabling the employee’s homosexuality to 
swallow all other aspects of the employee’s identity.”). 
 95.  See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) ; 
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2005); DeSantis v. 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Appellants now 
ask us to employ the disproportionate impact decisions as an artifice to ‘bootstrap’ 
Title VII protection for homosexuals under the guise of protecting men 
generally”); but see Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“explaining how Price Waterhouse “would not bootstrap protection for sexual 
orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically 
feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.”). 
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for example, a homosexual female employee was referred to as 
“Donald,” told she needed to “have sex with a man,” and 
informed that her non-conforming appearance was a 
“costume.”96  Despite these rather obvious examples of sex 
stereotyping, the Second Circuit found the record “devoid” of 
evidence of sex discrimination.97  The court reasoned that 
“stereotypical notions about how men and women should 
behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about 
heterosexuality and homosexuality,” but rather than 
acknowledging that sexual orientation could be protected in 
those instances, the court created an artificial distinction, 
stating, “gender stereotyping claim[s] should not be used to 
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation.”98 
Just as the specter of homosexuality tends to cloud the 
judicial lens with respect to stereotyping claims, some courts 
also have been unable to look beyond male gender stereotypes 
in cases involving the sexual harassment of gay men.  In 
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, the Seventh Circuit 
applied a “horseplay” exception to shield the employer of an all-
male workplace from the sex discrimination claim of an 
employee.99  In Hamm, a male employee whose co-workers 
suspected that he was gay was referred to as “girl scout,” 
accused of having a sexual relationship with a co-worker, 
mocked as potentially interested in sexual relations with other 
male employees, and threatened with sexual assault.100  
Unable to see beyond the gendered preconception that 
“sexually explicit remarks among male coworkers may be 
simply expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation,” the 
court held that “it is difficult to separate many of Hamm’s 
complaints from the significant amount of horseplay that 
occurred.”101  Because the “horseplay” exception is itself based 
 
 96.  Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 97.  See id. at 221. 
 98.  Id. at 218. 
 99.  Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, (7th Cir. 2003).  
The “horseplay” exception is particularly popular as a means of excusing sexually 
explicit and sometimes even abusive conduct in all-male employment situations.  
The exception is based on the idea that it is socially acceptable for men to “behave 
badly” in the workplace.  Because, all of this “bad behavior” is simply expected of 
men, it cannot possibly be because of sex.  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Harbert-Yeargin, 
266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 100.  Id. at 1060–61. 
 101.  Id. at 1063–64. 
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on stereotypes regarding acceptable male activity, particularly 
in the workplace, it has been heavily criticized in legal 
commentary.102 
The Sixth Circuit’s 2004 decision in Smith v. City of 
Salem103 represented a major turning point in sex-stereotyping 
jurisprudence.  In that case, Smith, a biologically male 
firefighter, was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder.  
After the diagnosis, Smith began “expressing a more feminine 
appearance on a full-time basis.”104  Smith’s behavior resulted 
in comments from co-workers, who felt that Smith was not 
acting “masculine enough.”105  Smith discussed these 
comments with a supervisor and informed the supervisor that 
Smith’s treatment eventually would include a physical 
transformation from male to female.106  The supervisor 
discussed the situation with other managers who devised a 
plan to require Smith to undergo three psychological 
 
 102.  See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 84, at 157–58 (“sexual exploitation, 
domination, intimidation, and abuse of men by other men constitutes a long-
overlooked form of gender discrimination that asserts the dominance of the 
masculine over the feminine and thus reflects and perpetuates deeply-rooted 
patterns of gender inequality.  Such conduct focuses intensely on portraying the 
target as a passive, feminized recipient of the harasser’s aggressive 
stereotypically masculine sexual advances.  As a result, the conduct echoes and 
enforces entrenched notions of male dominance in which power is identified and 
allocated based on the possession of stereotypically masculine physical and 
behavioral characteristics such as larger physical size, superior physical 
strength, aggressiveness, and sexual assertiveness.”); McGinley, supra note 30, 
at 725 (“[b]y openly abusing men who do not conform to gender stereotypes, men 
police the social and gender order at work, reinforcing the definition of certain 
jobs as ‘masculine’ and closed to non-conforming men and most women.”).  The 
courts’ willingness to see “deeper” motivations in sexually charged language is 
somewhat perplexing.  Since the courts appear willing to look past the superficial, 
it stands to reason that they could also look just one step deeper still to discover 
that the use of these terms, though not immediately motivated by “sex,” still 
evince a hostility to “sex” or “women” or both, and have the practical effect of 
making the workplace a more hostile environment.  See L. Camille Hebert, Sexual 
Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 574 (1995) (“sexual 
epithets often directed at women, such as ‘cunt’ and ‘bitch,’ clearly reflect the 
gender-based nature of the animus that motivate them.”).  Thus, the courts’ 
“horseplay” jurisprudence seems to be nothing more than an effort to cherry-pick 
those motivations convenient to their conclusion, while ignoring others. 
 103.  Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th. Cir. 2004).  See Ling, 
supra note 35, at 285 (stating that “Smith upturns rigid sex categories and allows 
both sexes to participate in the full range of gender expressions”). 
 104.  Id. at 568. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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interviews in the hope of pressuring Smith into resigning.107  
Smith sued the city under Title VII for sex discrimination 
based on gender-nonconforming behavior.  The district court 
ruled that Smith’s status as a transsexual precluded such a 
claim.108 
The appeals court rejected the district court’s ruling as 
well as its logic.  The court criticized those decisions that 
elevated status over behavior and held that “a label, such as 
‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where 
the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her 
gender non-conformity.”109  The court then went on to find that 
Smith’s claim fit squarely within the zone of forbidden sex-
stereotyping: 
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates 
against women because, for instance, they do not wear 
dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination 
because the discrimination would not occur but for the 
victim’s sex.  It follows that employers who discriminate 
against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or 
otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex 
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur 
but for the victim’s sex.110 
Since the Smith decision, most courts have ruled that 
sexual orientation or transgender status does not 
automatically defeat a sex-stereotyping claim.111  A number of 
decisions, in fact, have held that a plaintiff’s sexual orientation 
should have no bearing at all on the validity of a claim based 
on gender nonconformity.112 
 
 107.  Id. at 568–69. 
 108.  Id. at 569, 574. 
 109.  Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
 110.  Id. at 574. 
 111.  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Construction, Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 
2013); Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Business 
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009); Koren v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 894 
F. Supp.2d 1032 (N.D. Ohio 2012); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp.2d 293 
(D.D.C. 2008); see also Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 
1435995 (EEOC, April 20, 2012)  (EEOC ruling that a transgender job applicant 
could maintain a complaint against a federal agency both under a sex-
stereotyping theory and as a matter of direct sex discrimination); but see Etsitty 
v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2008) (ruling that 
discrimination against a transsexual employee because of that employee’s status 
does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 112.  See, e.g., Glenn v. Bumbry, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating 
that “[a]ll persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination 
1_BEFORT FINAL 3/25/2016  2:33 AM 
2016] SAME SEX MARRIAGE & TITLE VII 229 
Some commentators have argued that homosexuality is 
itself a gender non-conforming trait and therefore 
discrimination against all homosexuals should be subsumed 
under the sex stereotyping theory.113  Stated another way, this 
theory posits that because society expects males to be attracted 
to females and vice versa, heterosexuality is a gender 
stereotype.  Therefore, discrimination against homosexuals is 
discrimination because they fail to conform to an expectation 
attached to their sex, i.e., the expectation that they are 
attracted to the opposite sex.114 
Two federal district court decisions have arguably adopted 
this line of thought.  In Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country 
Club, a lesbian chef was harassed by her supervisor for having 
a relationship with another woman.115  Her supervisor would 
ask her, “[d]o you wear the dick in the relationship?” and “[a]re 
you the man?”116  In denying the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for Oregon held 
that: 
[A] jury could find that [the supervisor] repeatedly 
harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller 
did not conform to [the supervisor’s] stereotype of how a 
woman ought to behave.  Heller is attracted to and dates 
other women, whereas [her supervisor] believes that a 
woman should be attracted to and date only men.117 
The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, in Centola v. 
Potter, made a similar observation, opining, “stereotypes about 
homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the 
 
on the basis of gender stereotype”); Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 
285, 292 (3rd Cir. 2009) (stating “[t]here is no basis in the statutory or case law to 
support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender 
stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not”); Centola v. 
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that “if Centola can 
demonstrate that he was discriminated against ‘because of . . . sex’ as a result of 
sex stereotyping, the fact that he was also discriminated against on the basis of 
his sexual orientation has no legal significance under Title VII.”). 
 113.  See Kramer, supra note 28, at 468; Szwalbnest, supra note 91, at 90–91. 
 114.  Such an approach would alleviate a key deficiency of relying on the Price 
Waterhouse line of cases to achieve protection for gays and lesbians, namely that 
not all homosexuals are gender non-conforming in their dress or behavior.  
Kramer, supra note 28, at 468. 
 115.  Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 
(D. Or. 2002). 
 116.  Id. at 1217. 
 117.  Id. at 1224. 
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proper roles of men and women . . . [t]he gender stereotype at 
work here is that “real” men should date women, and not other 
men.”118 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), in two administrative decisions involving federal 
employees, similarly has adopted a broad view of what 
constitutes prohibited sex discrimination.  In Macy v. Holder, 
the EEOC ruled that the term “sex” in Title VII encompasses 
both biological sex and gender, and that an employer who 
discriminates because a person is transgender necessarily “has 
engaged in disparate treatment ‘related to the sex of the 
victim.’ ” 119  Similarly, in Complainant v. Foxx, the EEOC 
stated: 
[W]e conclude that sexual orientation is inherently a “sex-
based consideration,” and an allegation of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of 
sex discrimination under Title VII.  A complainant alleging 
that an agency took his or her sexual orientation into 
account in an employment action necessarily alleges that 
the agency took his or her sex into account.120 
Although these cases may be groundbreaking, they 
currently represent a decidedly minority view among the 
federal courts. 
Thus, the prevailing reach of the sex-stereotyping theory 
of sex discrimination can be summarized as follows: while the 
status of being homosexual or transgender is not a protected 
class, individuals who engage in gender non-conforming 
appearance or behavior - regardless of being straight or gay - 
are protected by Title VII’s sex provision. 
IV. RELATIONAL DISCRIMINATION121 IN THE WORKPLACE 
A. Relational Race Discrimination 
Between 1973 and 1985, a split developed among the U.S. 
 
 118.  Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 119.  Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 at *6–
7 (EEOC, April 20, 2012) 
 120.  Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 
at *6 (EEOC, July 15, 2015). 
 121.  This Article uses the term “relational” discrimination instead of the more 
traditionally recognized “associational” or “associative” discrimination.  
Associational discrimination has taken on a broader meaning in the Title VII case 
law, including claims where the spouse of an employee in retaliation for protected 
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district courts regarding the question of whether 
discrimination based on an interracial marriage created a 
cognizable claim under Title VII.122  In Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, 
a district court in Alabama concluded that such discrimination 
was not prohibited under Title VII.123  The court reasoned that 
the language of the statute required that the discrimination be 
on account of “individual’s race” and, thus, where an employer 
discriminates not because of the employee’s race, but because 
of the race of the employee’s spouse, Title VII did not apply.124  
In Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, a 
district court in New York rejected this argument, instead 
holding that the claim was cognizable.125  The court reasoned 
“if Whitney was discharged because, as alleged, the defendant 
disapproved of a social relationship between a white woman 
and a black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a factor in 
the decision to fire her as that of her friend.”126  In short, the 
employee’s race is implicated because the discrimination is 
based on that race being “different from the race of the people 
[she] associated with.”127 
When the issue finally percolated up to the Eleventh 
Circuit, the court sided with the “irrefutable” logic of the New 
York district court.128  In Parr v. Woodman of the World Life 
Insurance Company, a white applicant was rejected from a 
position after he made it known to the employer that he was 
 
activity.  This is a different scenario from the employer who discriminates 
because of the employee’s protected status in relation to the protected status of 
their spouse.  Thus, a few scholars have begun referring to this latter form as 
relational discrimination as opposed to associative discrimination in recognition 
of these two different concepts.  See generally Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift 
From Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209 (2012). 
 122.  Compare Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973) 
(holding discrimination based on interracial relationships uncovered); Adams v. 
Governor’s Comm. On Postsecondary Educ., No. C80–624A, 1981 WL 27101 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981) (same); with Reiter v. Center Consolidated Sch. Dist., No. 26–JT, 618 
F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding interracial relationships protected); 
Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Whitney v. 
Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  
 123.  Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 215 (N.D. Ala. 1973). 
 124.  Id. at 208–10. 
 125.  Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. 
Supp. 1366–67(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 126.  Id. at 1366. 
 127.  Reiter v. Center Consolidated Sch. Dist., No. 26-JT, 618 F. Supp. 1458, 
1460 (D. Colo. 1985). 
 128.  Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
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married to a black woman.129  The court reviewed the split in 
the district courts, as well as prior decisions under section 
1981—where the court had found interracial relationships 
covered130—and concluded that Whitney provided the most 
compelling analysis.  The court reasoned that Congress’ intent 
to eradicate race discrimination ought not to be hampered by 
“a combination of a strict construction of the statute in a battle 
with semantics.”131  The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits have all reached the same conclusion.132  Not a single 
court in the past thirty years has held otherwise.133 
The concept of relational discrimination is not limited to 
interracial marriage.  It applies more broadly to any 
discrimination where the employee is targeted because of his 
race in relation to the race of someone else.  In Tetro v. Elliot 
Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, for 
example, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case of a car dealer 
who was terminated after his biracial daughter came to visit 
him at work.134  The Court found that “the dealership has been 
charged with reacting adversely to Tetro because of Tetro’s 
 
 129.  Id. at 889. 
 130.  Section 1981 states: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”  42 U.S.C. § 1981.  Prior 
to Parr, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits had concluded that 
discrimination based on interracial relationships was prohibited under this Act.  
See Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1980); Fiedler v. Marumsco 
Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 
(5th Cir. 1975); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975).  In 
Parr, the Eleventh Circuit officially adopted this conclusion as to section 1981, 
791 F.2d at 890. 
 131.  Parr, 791 F.2d at 892 (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 
888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
 132.  Holcomb v. Iona College, 251 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008); Tetro v. Elliot 
Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994–95 
(6th Cir. 1999); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156F.3d 581, 589 
(5th Cir. 1998); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 133.  The District of Columbia Circuit has criticized the conclusion that section 
1981 covered interracial relationships arguing that it may create a standing 
issue.  Fair Emp. Council of Greater Wash. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 
1279 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  However, they are alone in their criticism, and even if 
the D.C. Circuit were eventually vindicated, the Title VII and section 1981 are 
not automatically coextensive. 
 134.  Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, 173 
F.3d 988, 990 (6th Cir. 1999). 
1_BEFORT FINAL 3/25/2016  2:33 AM 
2016] SAME SEX MARRIAGE & TITLE VII 233 
race in relation to the race of his daughter.”135  In the court’s 
view, “[t]he net effect is that the dealership has allegedly 
discriminated against Tetro because of his race.”136  Therefore, 
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on the protected 
status of the employee in relation to the protected status of 
another individual. 
B. Relational Sex Discrimination 
Many cases categorized as “sexual orientation” cases in 
the case law and commentary may actually be better 
understood as relational sex discrimination cases.  The Heller 
decision discussed in the preceding section illustrates how 
anti-gay harassment can be based not simply on anti-gay 
animus, but also on animus toward same-sex relationships.  As 
the court noted in that case, “a jury could find [the supervisor] 
repeatedly harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller 
because . . . Heller is attracted to and dates other women, 
whereas [her supervisor] believes that a woman should be 
attracted to and date only men.”137 
The impact of relational discrimination is demonstrated 
by the facts, often overlooked, in a number of sexual 
orientation cases.138  In Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., an 
effeminate male employee was subjected to anti-gay 
harassment including being called “princess,” “rosebud,” and 
“faggot,” along with a litany of other threatening and hostile 
statements.139  However, the discrimination also took on a 
relational tone when Prowel was accused of having sexual 
relations with other male employees, and a co-worker said to 
him “a man should not lay with another man.”140  Whether 
because the attorney did not focus on the relational 
statements, or because the court chose to ignore them, the 
decision focused instead on the sex-stereotyping aspects of the 
claim.141 
 
 135.  Id. at 995. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 
(D.Or. 2002). 
 138.  See, e.g., Lundin v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 
1979) (holding against female plaintiff who was terminated for being in a same-
sex relationship). 
 139.  Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 140.  Id. at 288. 
 141.  Id. at 292.  
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In some cases, however, the same-sex relationships are, in 
fact, the root of the discrimination, rather than simply one 
factor among many.  In Valadez v. Uncle Julio’s, a lesbian 
server was in a relationship with a female co-worker, when her 
supervisor began asking to have a “tag team” with the 
employee and her partner.142  The court focused on the 
“uninvited sexual solicitations” as creating a claim for 
traditional sexual harassment,143 but the employer’s 
motivation, which is supposed to be the primary concern of 
Title VII analysis, appears to have been based as much on a 
fetishized view of lesbian relationships as it was based on his 
desire for sex with the employee.  In Ayala-Sepulveda v. 
Municipality of San German, a male plaintiff was similarly 
engaged in a sexual relationship with a male co-worker.144  
When that relationship ended the co-worker publicly denied 
ever being in a relationship with the plaintiff and began to 
threaten him with violent reprisal for “fabricating” the 
relationship.145  The discrimination this employee faced was 
rooted not in his sexual orientation per se, but in the fact that 
he had engaged in a relationship with another man.  The 
violent response of his partner only strengthens the conclusion 
that the discrimination was “because of sex.”  It is extremely 
unlikely that the plaintiff would have been subjected to such 
harassment if he were female; rather it was because the 
plaintiff was male that his partner responded so violently in 
defense of his masculinity. 
The EEOC expressly recognized a relational or 
associational claim of sex discrimination in Complainant v. 
Foxx, an administrative decision involving a federal 
employee.146  In that case, the complainant alleged that he was 
not selected for a permanent position because of his sexual 
orientation.  The decision explained that an employee can state 
a claim of sex discrimination by showing that the employer’s 
conduct was motivated by the sex of another person with whom 
the employee was associating.  Drawing an explicit analogy to 
 
 142.  Valadez v. Uncle Julio’s, 895 F.3d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 143.  Id. at 1014. 
 144.  Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German, 661 F.2d 130, 134 
(D.P.R. 2009). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 
(EEOC, July 15, 2015). 
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the race context, the decision concluded that “Title VII 
similarly prohibits employers from treating an employee or 
applicant differently than other employees or applicants based 
on the fact that such individuals are in a same-sex marriage or 
because the employee has a personal association with someone 
of a particular sex.”147 
These cases illustrate that real or perceived same-sex 
relationships are often the focal point of sexually charged 
discrimination.  Although most courts have attempted to 
resolve these cases by looking to existing theories of sex 
discrimination, such a practice ignores an important factor and 
consequently one that reveals the inherently sex-based 
characteristic of the discrimination.  Although same-sex 
relationships in the form of marriage are now recognized as 
lawful, incidents of discrimination such as these are likely to 
remain an issue.  Thus, we must reconcile the legalization of 
same-sex marriages with not only the long history of judicial 
skepticism toward sexual orientation discrimination claims 
under Title VII but also the long accepted principle that 
relational discrimination is prohibited under Title VII. 
V. PROTECTING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES UNDER TITLE VII 
A. Same-Sex Marriage Discrimination as Sex-
Stereotyping 
When an employee experiences discrimination because of 
their same-sex marriage, sex stereotyping is almost certain to 
be at the core of the discrimination, or at the very least it will 
be implicated by the discriminatory behavior, words, and 
actions.  This reality is illustrated by the circumstances in 
Koren v. Ohio Bell, where a gay employee was discriminated 
against when he entered into a legal same-sex marriage.148  
Koren and his partner had traveled to Massachusetts, where 
they applied for and entered into a legal marriage.149  The two 
then returned to Ohio, where both were employed.150  Upon his 
return Koren received a legal name change, adopting his 
husband’s surname.151  When he returned to work at Ohio Bell, 
 
 147.  Id. at 9. 
 148.  See Koren v. Ohio Bell, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (2012). 
 149.  Id. at 1034. 
 150.  See id. 
 151.  Id. 
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his supervisor became hostile toward Koren, objecting to his 
marriage.152  As part of the course of harassment to which 
Koren was subjected, his supervisor refused to acknowledge 
his new surname and continued to call him by his prior 
name.153  The court held that adopting a partner’s surname is 
a traditionally feminine practice, and that the employer’s 
adverse reaction could be actionable as sex stereotyping.154 
The Koren decision offers a blueprint for fitting same-sex 
marriage within the protective ambit of the sex-stereotyping 
theory.  Traditional marriage involves a union between one 
male and one female, and opposite sex marriage represents 
gender-conforming behavior.155  In contrast, same-sex 
marriage, with or without an accompanying change in a 
spousal surname, constitutes gender non-conforming behavior.  
As such, an employer’s adverse treatment of an employee 
because of a same-sex marriage violates the sex-stereotyping 
principle established in Price Waterhouse and constitutes sex 
discrimination for purposes of Title VII. 
The act of same-sex marriage also goes well beyond status 
and involves behavior that, even if now lawful, runs counter to 
long-held societal expectations.  Unlike some workplace 
perceptions, hostility to same-sex marriage cannot be confused 
with—or consumed by—an employee’s unprotected 
homosexual status.  Given the now-recognized distinction 
between status and behavior156 and given that same-sex 
marriage clearly involves a behavior that goes significantly 
beyond a person’s status as homosexual, same-sex marriage 
fits comfortably on the behavior side of the well-established 
legal divide under Title VII. 
B. Same-Sex Marriage Discrimination as Relational Sex 
Discrimination 
Protecting individuals on the basis of sexual orientation as 
a relational concept under Title VII may be difficult since gays 
and lesbians not in same-sex relationships would find it hard 
 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Koren v. Ohio Bell, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (2012). 
 154.  Id. at 1038. 
 155.  See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: What It Is, Why It Matters, and 
the Consequences of Refining It, available at http://www.heritage.org/research
/reports/2013/13. 
 156.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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to prove “relational” discrimination, not to mention that it 
would naturally raise the “bootstrapping” concerns that have 
so worried the federal judiciary.  However, protecting 
individuals in same-sex marriages is a different matter 
entirely, as it involves a specific and identifying relationship, 
the objections to which are derived entirely from the sex of the 
individuals involved.  The relational dimensions of same-sex 
marriages, therefore, require that they be protected under 
Title VII’s widely accepted prohibition of relational 
discrimination.  This conclusion is further supported by the 
two analytical heuristics most often utilized by the Supreme 
Court: the race-gender analogy and the comparators heuristic. 
1. The Race-Gender Analogy 
It is clear that discrimination based on different protected 
classes often bear similarities that illuminate the 
discriminatory character of the acts.157  The clear and 
unequivocal intent of the Civil Rights Act was to “eradicate 
race discrimination” and to “strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women.”158  In outlawing 
relational discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit held that this 
goal ought not to be hampered by “a combination of strict 
construction of the statute in a battle with semantics.”159  The 
invidious nature of discrimination against legally married 
same-sex couples is that doing so allows employers to police the 
private decisions of male and female employees in their 
selection of intimate partners, a selection process that 
implicates deeply held beliefs regarding a person’s sex and 
gender.  It was clear in 1967 that such conduct would amount 
to discrimination if the policing involved the race of the 
partner, and it is no less true today that it amounts to 
discrimination when the policing involves the sex of a married 
 
 157.  See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleview, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 579 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“If an African American is repeatedly subjected to racial slurs and talk of 
lynching by his co-workers, we typically do not ask, ‘But was he singled out 
because of his race?’ . . . we understand that the harassment, perpetrated through 
the vehicle of race, is discriminatory and injurious in and of itself, even if his 
harassers wanted to make his life miserable for reasons altogether unrelated to 
the color of his skin.”) 
 158.  L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978). 
 159.  Parr v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 
1986) (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 
1970)). 
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partner.160  In short, looking at discrimination because of a 
same-sex relationship as compared to an interracial 
relationship reveals that in either case, such discrimination 
would have the “net effect” of perpetuating, rather than 
eradicating, differential treatment based on a protected status. 
As discussed above, a number of courts have recognized 
that discrimination based on same-sex relationships is often 
part and parcel of discrimination “because of sex.”161  In Heller, 
the employee in a same-sex relationship was bombarded with 
inappropriate questions such as “[d]o you wear the dick in the 
relationship?” and “[a]re you the man?”162  These questions are 
saturated with hostility to gender non-conformity, revealing, 
as so often is the case, that discrimination because of sexual 
relationships is based on sex or gender stereotypes, which act 
to perpetuate gender hierarchies that disadvantage women 
and gender non-conforming men.  In Hamm, the hostility of the 
environment to women and effeminate men is even clearer, 
where an employee was threatened with physical violence for 
simply having a close friendship with another man.163  
Instances like these make clear that discrimination based on 
same-sex relationships is often part of a systematic effort to 
police gender norms, preserve the masculine identity of the 
workplace, and protect the masculine identities of the male 
employees and managers.  Thus, permitting employers to 
police the decision of an employee’s romantic partner only 
reinforces an environment that is hostile to all but the most 
gender conforming men, a result that inimical to the goals Title 
 
 160.  Mr. Theodore Schroeder, argues that this discrimination is based on the 
sex of the partner rather than the sex of the employee, and, therefore, is not 
protected.  See Theodore A. Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical 
Failures of Gay and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination, 
6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 333, 366 (1998).  However, this view was rejected in the 
relational line of cases as too narrow a view.  The proper, and logical, 
interpretation is that the discrimination is not based solely on the race (or sex) of 
the spouse, but on the relationship between the employee’s race (or sex) and the 
spouse’s race (or sex).  The employee’s protected status is an essential element of 
the discrimination.  Indeed, the author’s failure to recognize that this was the 
prevailing interpretation greatly undermines his challenge to contemporary 
feminist scholarship. 
 161.  See notes 137-147 and accompanying text. 
 162.  Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 
(D. Or. 2002). 
 163.  Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
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VII. 
Where the discrimination is based not merely on a same-
sex relationship, but on a legally recognized same-sex 
marriage, the connection to impermissible relational 
discrimination becomes even clearer.  In Koren, the animus did 
not take on the usual anti-gay epithets, but rather the simple 
refusal to recognize the same-sex marriage.164  In such a case, 
the discrimination is based not on the sexual orientation of the 
employee, but on the fact that he was a man who chose to 
engage in a lawful marital relationship with another man.  As 
the EEOC recognized in Complainant v. Foxx, this is relational 
discrimination in its simplest and clearest form.165 
Ultimately, discrimination based on same-sex 
relationships has the effect of reinforcing gender stereotypes, 
perpetuating sex discrimination, and making the workplace 
unsafe for all but a few gender conforming men.  This 
undoubtedly falls within the “spectrum of disparate treatment” 
envisioned by the courts, and it mirrors the experiences of the 
men and women who challenged social resistance to interracial 
marriages.  As such, same-sex marriages should be afforded 
the same protection that was extended to interracial couples. 
2. The Comparators Heuristic 
The comparators heuristic requires that the courts 
compare the employees’ treatment to that of other employees 
“who are similar to the complainant in all respects but for the 
protected characteristic.”166  In Koren, a comparator would, 
therefore, be a female employee who married a man and took 
the surname of her husband.  As the court in Koren notes, the 
comparator’s scenario is the socially accepted norm.167  Thus, 
 
 164.  See Koren v. Ohio Bell, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38. 
 165.  Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 
at 9  (EEOC, July 15, 2015).  In the broader realm of employment law, most states 
have recognized a public policy exception to the employment at-will rule that 
protects employees who exercise a statutory right, such as filing for workers 
compensation benefits, from retaliatory dismissal.  See Stephen F. Befort, Labor 
and Employment Law at the Milennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment, 43 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 351, 381–82 (2002).  As a matter of policy, 
an employee who exercises the statutory right to enter into a lawful same-sex 
marriage also should be shielded from bias that operates to interfere with the 
enjoyment of that statutory right. 
 166.  Goldberg, supra note 40, at 731. 
 167.  Koren, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. 
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even though the opinion does not reveal the treatment of 
female employees, it is not a stretch to assume that they would 
not be treated with the hostility that Koren experienced.  More 
often than not, therefore, a comparators analysis will heavily 
favor a gay or lesbian employee who is discriminated because 
they choose to enter into a same-sex relationship. 
3. Addressing Calls for a Broader Application 
Professor Victoria Schwartz recently argued that all 
sexual orientation is inherently relational discrimination.168  
She asserts, “sexual orientation is an inherently relational 
concept . . . if a female is discriminated against for being a 
lesbian, she is discriminated against for her sex (female) in 
relation to her sexual relationships with others (female).”169  
Schwartz further contends that protection for sexual 
orientation should extend beyond relationships that actually 
exist at the time of the discriminations, arguing “an employer 
who is motivated by animus . . . likely is so motivated 
regardless of the specific status of that employee’s 
relationships.”170  Schwartz is likely correct, but it is doubtful 
that the courts will recognize her argument any time soon.  The 
current Title VII regime is based on the intent of the 
perpetrator,171 and gay and lesbian plaintiffs making use of 
Schwartz’s argument could have a hard time making their case 
without pointing to specific relationships of which the 
employer was aware.  Furthermore, as we have noted above, 
anti-gay epithets can also be used as a means of discriminating 
against gender non-conformity or as a means of emasculation.  
Though both of these uses should be prohibited as “because of 
sex,” neither can reasonably be characterized as relational in 
nature. 
Whatever the argument for a broader view of relational 
discrimination, adverse action taken in response to same-sex 
marriage, a specific and identifiable action that is inextricably 
 
 168.  Schwartz, supra note 121 at 211–12. 
 169.  Schwartz, supra note 121 at 248. 
 170.  Schwartz, supra note 121 at 249. 
 171.  Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Title VII is 
clear that it is the harassers’ discriminatory animus and mental state that are 
crucial to determining whether Title VII outlaws the harasser’s conduct . . . Thus, 
while [the plaintiff]’s impression of why his fellow workers took these actions 
against him is relevant, it is not conclusive.”). 
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tied to a person’s sex, clearly is based upon the relationship 
and the sex of the two marital parties.  Protecting such a 
relationship is not a giant leap, but a reasoned extension of the 
protection afforded to interracial couples. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of sex discrimination law has become very 
complicated and unpredictable.  Against this murky landscape, 
the proper treatment of same-sex marriages under Title VII is 
simple and clear.  Recognizing that discrimination based on 
same-sex marriages is sex discrimination requires, at most, 
only a basic understanding of the gender make up of those 
relationships and the common sense application of existing and 
widely accepted theories of Title VII liability.  Discrimination 
based on a same-sex marriage clearly qualifies as sex-
stereotyping retaliation in response to gender non-conforming 
behavior.  Since such discrimination is also based on the sex of 
one partner in relation to the sex of the other, it is also classic 
relational discrimination.  With same-sex marriage now 
lawful, the courts will not be able to avoid incorporating these 
relationships into employment discrimination law for much 
longer.  A common sense application of the current Title VII 
regime demands that same-sex couples receive protection 
under Title VII. 
 
